No livro Plato's Philosophers, Catherine Zuckert olha para o Timeu de Platão de maneira renovada e revive implicitamente a tese de A. E. Taylor, segundo a qual Timeu não fala por Platão. Taylor devotou seu escrupuloso comentário de 1927 para construir esse argumento, o qual, porém, encalhou diante da questão colocada dez anos depois por F. M. Cornford, no livro Plato's Cosmology (viii): "Qual poderia ter sido o seu motivo?" O motivo de Platão era tanto pedagógico quanto parmenídico: assim como a deusa expõe o peregrino à "Via da Opinião" depois da revelação da "Verdade", assim também o Timeu de Platão expõe o leitor a um relato poético de uma cosmologia baseada na visão -outro kosmo/ j e0 pe/ wn a0 pathlo/ j (Parmênides, B8.52) -depois da revelação, feita na República V-VII, da ontologia platônica puramente inteligível. Palavras-chave: Platão, Timeu, pedagogia parmenídica.
In his influential 2005 article "Ei0 kw\ j Mu= qoj," Myles Burnyeat draws an important distinction between internal and external coherence in the case of Plato's Timaeus. 1 While internal coherence is required from Timaeus-and this claim is crucial for Burnyeat's argument about the meaning of ei0 kw\ j mu= qoj-external coherence is not; in other words, while an account cannot be ei0 kw/ j if it contradicts itself, 2 a series of accounts can be inconsistent with each other without losing the more positive sense for the word ei0 kw/ j that Burnyeat's article is intended to secure for it. 3 The question of external incoherence arises because immediately prior to Timaeus' introduction of the term ei0 kw\ j mu= qoj at 29d2, he makes the remarkable admission that discourses like his-discourses about copies as opposed to exemplars-may well be inconsistent with themselves (e9 autoi= j at 29c6); this admission momentarily complicates Burnyeat's case. Despite the facts of elementary Greek, 4 and relying on the authority of John Burnet's editorial decisions, 5 that case turns on the question of whether Timaeus' discourse is best understood as a single mu/ qoj or lo/ goj (on the one hand) or-and this is Burnyeat's claim-it is best understood as a series of lo/ goi that are each internally coherent but are not collectively so. 6 Burnyeat obscures the fact that there is incontrovertibly a Timaean lo/ goj of lo/ goi, wherein these lo/ goi, each in itself "a complex of statements standing to each other in some logical relation," 7 is in turn merely one of those "statements" that collectively constitute some larger lo/ goj, in this case, that singular ei0 kw\ j mu= qoj, i.e., the words with which he famously describes his discourse.
Not surprisingly, Burnyeat begins the relevant passage by emphasizing instances of the plural lo/ goi: "My second comment is on the plural lo/ goi at 29c6 (which I would set beside the plural ei0 ko/ twn mu/ qwn at 59c6)." 8 The problems here are three. First of all, the later passage from Timaeus 59c6 refers to "pursuing the idea of ei0 ko/ twn mu/ qwn" (translation and emphasis mine); 9 it is therefore the idea that there is a form or genre of ei0 ko/ tej mu= qoi that leads Timaeus to employ the plural beginning at 29b4 because he is distinguishing between two types of discourses, some of which can be characterized in one way, and others in another. The second problem is that Burnyeat chooses not to cite a parallel instance of the plural-here the reference is to th\ n twñ ei0 ko/ twn lo/ gwn du/ namin at 48d2-immediately before referring to his own discourse in the singular, indeed as ei0 ko/ ta at 48d3. And of course the greatest weakness in Burnyeat's case is the remarkable equation: "e9 autoi= j here = a0 llh/ loij" (29c6); by no manner of means does "with themselves" mean the same thing as "with one another." As if acknowledging the problematic nature of an interpretation that involves this egregious lexicographical audacity, Burnyeat concludes the passage on a more modest note: "I trust that everyone will agree that this interpretation is preferable to one that understands Timaeus to mean that a given account may be internally inconsistent, at variance with it itself." 10 Despite the fact that she refers to "Burnyeat's seminal paper" 11 in her recent book Nature and Divinity in Plato's Timaeus (2012), 12 Sarah Broadie has discovered an internal incoherence in Timaeus' discourse of that undermines Burnyeat's analysis. Her discovery originates in the following hymn to sight at 47a1-b2:
"As my account has it [kata\ to\ n e0 mo\ n lo/ gon], our sight has indeed proved to be a source of supreme benefit to us, in that none [ou0 dei\ j] of our present statements [twñ nu= n lo/ gwn] about the universe could ever have been made if we had never seen any stars, sun, or heaven. As it is, however, our ability to see the periods of day-and-night, of month and of years, of equinoxes and solstices, has led to the invention of number, and given us the idea of time and opened the path to enquiry into the nature of the universe. These pursuits have given us philosophy, a gift from the gods to the mortal race whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed." 13 Broadie comments as follows: The careful reader will observe that the possibility that Plato "missed the difficulty" contradicts the first sentence of Broadie's incoherence claim, 17 quoted above. Because this sentence opens the door to the central theme of this paper, I will quote it again, this time for purposes of analysis: Timaeus from Plato, her own approach is to assume that Timaeus' remarks are actually Plato's as well and, indeed, that these are remarks that Plato in particular believed were [3] "well worth making." Broadie's proof for this statement is not simply based on the implicit assumption that since Plato made these remarks-albeit through Timaeus-he ipso facto considered them "well worth making"; instead, her proof of [3] is that making these remarks [4] "comes with a cost." 18 What Broadie means, of course, is that Timaeus' remarks about vision are internally incoherent and thus that the proof that Plato regarded them as worth making is that they are made at the cost of internal incoherence. Indeed it is to explain this incoherence that Broadie is writing the paragraph: she elucidates it in the remainder of it. But in the context of n. 22, her claim at [5] that Plato was aware of the incoherence is made at the cost of her own coherence because Broadie raises the possibility that "Plato missed the difficulty" (n. 22) whereas she claims at [5] that "he can hardly have been unaware" of the same fact, i.e., that Plato's position "is internally incoherent." The important point, however, is not Broadie's own incoherence except insofar as it disappears by discriminating the discourse of Timaeus-which is "internally incoherent"-from its author Plato, who, as Broadie rightly senses, "can hardly have been unaware" of the fact. On this reading, it is Timaeus who is unaware of the difficulty, not Plato. 19 To put it another way: (1) if Broadie is correct in her initial sense that it is not the case that "Plato missed the difficulty" (as I believe she is), and (2) if Timaeus' account of vision is "internally incoherent" (as I believe it is), then (3) In a chapter entitled "Body, soul, and tripartition" in Plato's Natural Philosophy, 22 Thomas Johansen devotes considerable attention to the consistency of Timaeus' discourse with other Platonic dialogues. 23 Given his title, 24 there is never any doubt that by explicating the discourse of Timaeus, Johansen believes that he is also explicating the views of Plato; 25 he never raises the possibility that the proper investigation of the soul requires emancipation from "natural philosophy." 26 While Johansen readily admit that we might get the idea from Phaedo that Plato was an enemy of the body, 27 that idea needs rethinking; his chapter's purpose is to accomplish 20 Although I will postpone an explanation of this argument until it arises later in Broadie's paragraph, it is important to grasp that: (¬3) if Burnyeat's argument is sound, and (2) Broadie is correct that Timaeus' "vision example" is "internally incoherent," then (¬1) "Plato missed the difficulty," thereby contradicting what Broadie said at [5] that Plato "could hardly have been aware" of just this "difficulty." 21 Developmentalism note. 22 JOHANSEN, op. cit., p. 137-159. 23 Johansen has already devoted attention to the discourse's internal consistency, especially with respect to the receptacle in chapter 6 ("Space and Motion", 117-36); see especially Plato's Natural Philosophy, p. 124: "Has Timaeus slipped from one notion of coming into being to another without warning or is there a way in which these points can be combined within a single story?" Not surprisingly, the most effective defenders of "Platonic" consistency in Timaeus make good use of Aristotle; see p. 134: "Aristotle's approach to the chôra is essentially the one I have been advocating in this chapter." this process. 28 Indeed his chapter's most arresting image measures the distance from Phaedo to Timaeus: "the human body appears less like a prison for the rational soul and more, as one might put it, like a rather comfortable hotel with quite a few research facilities built in." 29 On the specific question of the three parts of the soul-he acknowledges, of course, that this doctrine is missing from Phaedo 30 -he carefully sidesteps the question of whether Timaeus is consistent with Republic, 31 admitting only that it is "different in emphasis." 32 More importantly, he deftly avoids commitment on the implications of the image of Glaucus in Book X, 33 the passage that indicates Socrates is not consistently upholding the view that the soul actually has three parts in Republic-despite the fact that this view allows him to locate justice in its internal harmony in Book IV 34 -because tripartition merely captures the appearance of the soul in its embodied state. 35 Johansen is at his best in explaining, by contrast, how embodiment 28 Idem, p. 159: "The dialogue forces us to rethink the image of Plato as enemy of the body." This is the chapter's last sentence. 29 Idem, p. 157. 30 Johansen usefully describes three different dialogues with respect to tripartition at Plato's Natural Philosophy, p. 158: "In the Phaedo the soul seems to be essentially unitary and rational as we see in the argument from the kinship with the forms (78b-80c). In contrast, the image of the chariot in the Phaedrus presents the soul as having three parts already prior to embodiment (246a-b). In comparison to these claims, the Timaeus occupies a more developed half-way house." 31 Johansen, Plato's Natural Philosophy, p. 153 n. 27: "I deliberately refer to differences in emphasis between the two dialogues. I do not claim to have identified any disagreements or inconsistencies in doctrine between them." 32 Idem, p. 153: "I would suggest that Timaeus' account of the tripartite soul is, generally speaking, different in emphasis from that of the Republic [n. 27]." See previous note. 33 Idem, p. 157: "There is a debate (which I shall not enter here) about whether the image [sc. of Glaucus] implies that the immortal soul is unitary or in some sense tripartite. However this may be, we can see how the passage could be read from the point of view of the Timaeus." 34 Idem, p. 154: "The case [sc. in the Republic] in which the parts of the soul are in conflict with each other is a useful way of introducing the distinction between the three parts, but that does not mean that we should take this case to be representative of the general, let alone natural, state of the soul." This sentence opens the way for one of Johansen's most ingenious arguments; as defined in Book IV, justice "presupposes that the lower parts of the soul are fundamentally able to co-operate with ends that have been determined by reason" (154). 35 "But though we have stated the truth of its present appearance [sc. as consisting of many parts], its condition as we have now contemplated it resembles that of the sea-god Glaucus whose first nature can hardly be made out by those who catch glimpses of him, because the original members of his body are broken off and mutilated and crushed and in every way marred by the waves, and other parts have attached themselves to him, accretions of shells and sea-weed and rocks, so that he is more like any wild creature than what he was by nature-even such, I say, is our vision of the soul marred by countless evils. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucon." "Where?" said he. "To its love of wisdom" (611c6-e1).
actualizes "a potential for irrationality" 36 already inherent in the preembodied soul. 37 But he is also deft-and this might be said to be the purpose of his book-in defending Timaeus' teleological approach to nature in a manner that does not so much ignore "the lesser gods" (who fashion the human body) but makes them a more or less detachable figure of (Timaean) speech. 38 In short, Timaeus' physicalization of tripartition must be comforting to those who are eager to exchange Socrates' prison for a comfortable hotel.
"Consequently our rationality is not exhibited simply in rational contemplation in disregard of the influence of the body, but in pursuit of a composite life of soul and body. Caring for the self, as we saw, extends to caring for the entire tripartite soul, not just the intellect. Caring for the self also involves caring for the body." 39 It is not difficult to see why modern readers in particular would find this kind of Plato congenial. Since "the body has been designed with a view 36 Johansen, Plato's Natural Philosophy, p. 159: "Embodiment in this sense [sc. given that there was "already a certain structural and functional differentiation within the soul" at 158] brought out a potential for irrationality already inherent in the soul's original composition." 37 On the Aristotelian echo, cf. p. 157-58: "We are thus closer to an Aristotelian teleological relationship between the psychic parts and their proper organs than we are to anything that is explicitly offered in Plato's other dialogues." See also Johansen to increasing our rationality," 40 Timaeus' human being is what Johansen calls "a psychosomatic whole." 41 Rather than show why this notion of "a psychosomatic whole"-given the traditional conception of Platonism, one is tempted to call it a "postPlatonic" notion-resonates with modern readers, I want to point instead to a pre-Platonic parallel: fragment B16 of Parmenides:
For according to the mixture of much-wandering limbs which each man has, so is the mind which is associated with mankind: for it is the same thing which thinks, namely the constitution of the limbs in men, all and individually; for it is excess which makes Thought. 42 In the words of Patricia Curd, B16 "clearly wants to say something about human thought and to connect it in some way with states of the body." 43 And according to Curd, what it wants to say is antithetical to what the Goddess has already expressed in "Truth": whereas "genuine thought (and its object) are not to be identified with states of the body," 44 B16 promotes the opposite view. It therefore belongs in "the Way of Opinion": 45 although it may be like the truth, it is merely ei0 kw/ j. 46 46 As indicated by the previous note, the same dynamics visible in Johansen apply as well in the case of the "Doxa" of Parmenides; for a more recent example, see Giovanni Casertano, "Parmenides-Scholar of Nature". In: Cordero, Parmenides, venerable and awesome, p. 21-58 at p. 44: "According to this fragment [sc. B16], man is an unsplittable oneness of body and thought, and this is one more piece of evidence of how impossible it is in Parmenides to separate and oppose sensibility and reason." been and will always remain ontology 47 -to begin showing how his visionbased discourse undermines the purely intelligible foundation for "Truth" that Plato discovered in Parmenides. 48 Following Parmenides, Plato placed the physicalization of the tripartite soul in the mouth of his character Timaeus because this allowed him to present a lo/ goj that may well be ei0 kw/ j but is in fact several removes from the truth. 49 In short: Timaeus should not be regarded as a spokesman for Plato but rather for what Parmenides called "Doxa" and this explains the fact that Plato's Timaeus contains yet another "deceptive cosmos of words." 50 In an important new book, 51 Jenny Bryan examines the use of e0 oikw/ j and ei0 kw/ j in Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Plato, weaving together, in the process, a narrative based on allusion and dialogue between the three. Bryan's second chapter ("Parmenides' Allusive Ambiguity") vindicates a doxographical tradition going back to Plato that connects Parmenides to Xenophanes. 52 Although her emphasis throughout is on B8.50-61-the crucial word e0 oiko/ ta appears at line 60-her aporetic presentation of four possible meanings of the crucial word, 53 combined with a section entitled "Forensic Vocabulary in the Fragments," 54 gradually and delicately leads the reader to a 47 As indicated by Plutarch, the World Soul was the primary subject of controversy in antiquity although SORABJI, R. "The Mind-Body Relation in the Wake of Plato's Timaeus", in REYDAMS-SCHILS, Plato's Timaeus as Cultural Icon, is illuminating on the difficulties that Timaeus' physicalized account of the soul caused Platonists. Modern debate has shifted to "the receptacle" and SAYRE, K., "The Multilayered Incoherence of Timaeus' Receptacle", in REYDAMS-SCHILS, Plato's Timaeus as Cultural Icon, p. 60-79, is a useful introduction. Johansen, Plato's Natural Philosophy, chapter 6 ((interesting on Plutarch; note the reference to Grube at 138 n. 1)), and Broadie, Nature and Divinity, chapter 6, are more representative of Anglophone discussion. compelling account of the relationship between the Aletheia and the Doxa, 55 the central problem in Parmenides. Because the net result of Bryan's carefully consideration of the possibility that e0 oiko/ ta could mean (1) "similar," (2) "fitting" or "appropriate," (3) "specious," or (4) "plausible," is that it really means all four (hence the allusive ambiguity of Parmenides), one might well imagine that she could arrive at no definitive conclusion about this central problem. But thanks to a judicious use of Alexander Mourelatos, 56 that is exactly what she accomplishes. "With the Doxa, then, the goddess is giving a plausible account of typical mortal beliefs which stands in opposition to the properly convincing and cogent argument of the Aletheia. On this reading, e0 oikw/ j is not a word of recommendation. The Doxa may be a subjectively plausible cosmology. It may even be the most subjectively plausible of such cosmologies. It would not, however, be found convincing by anyone who understands the truth set out by the goddess. We, if we have such knowledge, should not be persuaded by the Doxa or by any such cosmologies because they do not possess such genuine cogency. Such accounts do not justify the faith that mortals place in them. They are merely subjectively plausible and thus, for all that they may possess the power to persuade, i.e. to deceive, those who are ignorant, they should not persuade those who recognize them as no more than specious fabrications." 57 55 The key to her approach is what might be called Bryan's "second sailing" announced at Likeness and Likelihood, 67: "Rather than interpreting e0 oikw/ j in the light of the Doxa, I want to consider what we can learn about the Doxa from the fact that the goddess claims it to be e0 oikw/ j. I have quoted this passage at length not only because it corroborates my own understanding of Parmenides' poem but also because I take Bryan's phrase "any such cosmologies" to include Plato's Timaeus.
Unfortunately, Bryan does not understand Plato's Timaeus in these terms; under the influence of Burnyeat, she argues that ei0 kw/ j in Plato has a positive sense; indeed, because Timaeus presents the cosmos as a "likeness" of "the Forms," it is ipso facto ei0 kw/ j. 58 The result is that Bryan's Parmenides is more of a Platonist than her Plato is allowed to be:
"My suggestion is that Timaeus is deliberately engaging with and seeking to correct Parmenides' absolute dismissal of the value of thinking about the perceptible world. Whilst Parmenides recognizes no more than a specious connection between the realm of Coming-to-be and Being, the cosmos that Timaeus describes is connected to the realm of Being insofar as it is created as an image of Being." 59 This is a uniquely important passage because-when taken out of context, as here-it might suggest that Bryan appropriately distinguishes between Timaeus and Plato; 60 alas such is not the case. 61 But in the context of her reading of Parmenides-a reading that boldly challenges an emerging orthodoxy aiming to rehabilitate the Doxa 62 -Bryan is getting very close to a more Parmenidean Plato. It is primarily because of Bryan's dependence on Burnyeat's article that she misunderstands Plato's intentions and it was because of this dependence that I began this paper with a consideration of his attempt to salvage a positive sense of ei0 kw/ j by introducing the It is worth recalling a remark Burnyeat makes in a defense of his external incoherence theory that Timaeus only admits the possibility that his various lo/ goi may be inconsistent with each other: "I trust that everyone will agree that this interpretation is preferable to one that understands Timaeus to mean that a given account may be internally inconsistent, at variance with it itself. That would give it zero probability, at once." 64 At the very least, Burnyeat's "everyone" is belied by A. E. Taylor: the central purpose of his classic commentary was to distinguish Plato's views from those of his character Timaeus, i.e., the claim that I am reviving here. This is what Taylor wrote:
When we find T. [sc. Timaeus] falling into inconsistency we may suspect that his creator is intentionally making him 'give himself away.' 65 In addition to finding an explanation for inconsistencies in Timaeus' discourse, Taylor also discovered (but did not develop) an amazing link between Parmenides-and in particular, his "Way of Opinion"-and Plato's Timaeus. Commenting on the fact that Timaeus identifies Fire and Earth as the first two elements at 31b6-8, he asks: "Is it possible that it may have been a reminiscence of this very passage led Aristotle into the loose statement that the two ["forms"] in Parmenides are ["fire"] and ["earth"]?" 66 Although Aristotle betrays no awareness that the two parts of Parmenides' poem need to be kept distinct, 67 Taylor's discovery that Aristotle erroneously conflates the two "forms" (with which the Goddess begins her account of "the deceptive cosmos of my words") with the two elements with which Timaeus begins his account of the world's body, points to an important truth: Plato's Timaeus is equivalent by analogy to Parmenides' "Way of Opinion." Most importantly, both accounts are explicitly ei0 kw/ j and, as Bryan has forcefully argued, Plato is deliberately alluding to Parmenides. 68 But Plato-as distinct from his character Timaeus (the very distinction Taylor undertook to prove)-intends the reader to recognize that both accounts are also equally a0 pathlo/ j ("deceptive") and it is this last step that Taylor did not take: he argues throughout that Plato was seeking a kind historical verisimilitude not easy to explain. 69 As a result, despite his philological acumen and encyclopedic knowledge, Taylor's theory that Plato had written Timaeus in order to give a historically accurate synthesis of Pythagoras and Empedocles persuaded next to nobody; less than ten years after publishing his magisterial commentary, F. M. Cornford posed his fatal question: "Why?" 70 Not surprisingly, this same question has likewise often been posed in opposition to those who take Parmenides' "Way of Opinion" to be deliberately deceptive. 71 In support of Taylor's distinction between Plato and Timaeusrecently revived (albeit without reference to Taylor) by Catherine Zuckert 72 -this paper will provide the same kind of answer to both questions: Plato followed his master in the use of what I am calling "Parmenidean pedagogy." After having offered the student the authentic revelation, the Goddess then exposed her audience to a deliberately false account-both "deceptive" and in Book IV but rather in Book VII, by means of the Allegory of the Cave. The importance of the Cave is already indicated in the great dialogue's opening word but the reason that "I went down" is of crucial importance only becomes obvious when Socrates offers Glaucon the speech that the City's founders will address to the temporarily rebellious Guardians who presumably concur with Glaucon's protest that it would be unjust to compel those Guardians to return to the Cave. 76 The most important passage in this speech is where Socrates compares the Guardians to citizens of other cities, who are justified in not returning to the Cave because their exit from it has been their own private affair.
"But you [u9 maj] we [h9 mei= j] have engendered for yourselves [u9 mi= n te au0 toi= j] and the rest of the city [th| = te a1 llh| po/ lei] to be, as it were, king-bees and leaders in the hive. You have received a better and more complete education than the others, and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go [katabate/ on] then, each in his turn, to 73 Cf. Bryan, Likeness and Likelihood, p. 129: "Successful lies need to be plausible." 74 I have italicized "unassailable" because I take this to be the purport of B8.61 (Freeman): "in order that no intellect of mortal men may outstrip you." Thinking rooted in the intelligible will always confront objections (and ridicule) from men of science determined to uphold truth-claims derived from empirical observation of the sensible world. Neither Plato nor Parmenides wanted their students to be shaken from a commitment to unchanging Being by the latest discoveries about Becoming. Bryan, Likeness and Likelihood, comes closest with the words "educative" (p. 111) and "instructive" (p. the habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there." 77 The key to my reading of the Republic is that just as the "you" to whom "we" are speaking here is not really or at least not solely the hypothetical Guardians of a strictly imaginary City but rather, to put it baldly, you-citizens of what Socrates calls "the other city" 78 -so also it is Plato who stands behind this "we"; it is he who has given you (for free) the best education that (no) money could buy and now he asks you as a philosopher to return to the Cave of political life in return. 79 It is this reading that determines my solution to the first problem that confronts the reader who turns-as Plato intended them to turn-from Republic to Timaeus: the problem of the missing fourth with which Plato's cosmological dialogue begins: "One, two, three … Where's number four, Timaeus?" 80 There is, of course, another case of something missing that arises shortly thereafter: while the summary of the previous day's conversation in Timaeus makes it obvious that this conversation resembled the conversation Socrates describes in Republic, it is equally obvious that plenty is missing. 81 In some sense, there are two similar problems at the beginning of Timaeus:
we are asked to consider what is missing in two different but conceivably related mysteries. 82 Certainly the Timaeus summary is missing the Allegory 77 Republic 520b5-c3; Shorey translation modified. 78 Republic 520b5. of the Cave; it is also missing the Divided Line and the Sun as well. 83 But given the accumulation of detail that surrounds the summary of what in Republic V is called "the Second Wave of Paradox" 84 -especially since the equal training the female Guardians for war ("the first Wave of Paradox") is present but treated more briefly 85 -it is pretty obvious that the first and most obvious thing the previous day's conversation is missing is "the third Wave of Paradox," 86 i.e., the assertion that philosophy and political power need to be combined in one person. 87 This combination is quickly made conspicuous in a second way by attributing precisely this combination to Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates who-it should be made explicit-are, as a triad, the "one, two, three" who precede the mention of the missing fourth. 88 The crucial passage is found toward the end of Socrates' longest speech in Timaeus, where he expresses an interest in seeing the City he constructed yesterday at war; 89 he wants to see its Guardians in action, 90 fighting both in words and deeds. 91 After having stated that he cannot accomplish this result himself, he then explains why neither poets nor sophists are capable of doing so. 92 The inadequacy of this triad leaves only his audience, 93 who combine philosophy and political experience. 94 He then enumerates-and it is the first time he has explicitly done so-a second triad and he discusses, in turn, the political and philosophical accomplishments of Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates. It is immediately after reviewing the credentials of his three interlocutors with respect to this combination that Socrates offers the reader a sentence 95 that contains Plato's carefully hidden solution to "the problem of the missing fourth." "Already yesterday I was aware of this [dio\ kai\ xqe\ j e0 gw\ dianoou/ menoj] when you asked me to discuss matters of government [u9 mwñ deome/ nwn ta\ peri\ th= j politei/ aj dielqei= n], and that's why I was eager to do your bidding. I knew that if you'd agree to make the follow-up speech [to\ n e9 xh= j lo/ gon], no one could do a better job than you [proqu/ mwj e0 xarizo/ mhn, ei0 dw\ j o3 ti to\ n e9 xh= j lo/ gon ou0 de/ nej a2 n u9 mwñ e0 qelo/ / ntwn i9 kanw/ teron a0 podoi= en]. No one today besides you could present our city pursuing a war that reflects her true character. Only you could give her all she requires. So now I'm done speaking on my assigned subject; I've turned the tables and assigned you to speak [-ei0 j ga\ r po/ lemon pre/ ponta katasth/ santej th\ n po/ lin a3 pant' au0 th| ta\ prosh/ konta a0 podoi= t' a2 n mo/ noi twñ nu= n ei0 pw\ n dh\ ta0 pitaxte/ nta, a0 ntepe/ taca u9 mi= n] on the subject I've just described [a4 kai\ nu= n le/ gw]." 96 Although I have provided an English translation, I am going to discuss this critical sentence in Greek. It begins with the words dio\ kai\ xqe\ j e0 gw\ dianoou/ menoj and they raise from the start the ambiguity of this "I": 97 is this e0 gw/ Socrates or Plato? As was the case in Republic VII, Plato and the reader will emerge simultaneously; he (as author) recovers from the "most majestic silence" of Phaedrus 275d6 at the same moment we overcome the characteristic passivity of the reader, the a0 sqe/ neia/ tij ("a certain indisposition") of Timaeus 17a4. 98 "You"-the "Missing Fourth"-are introduced in the next set of words: u9 mwñ deome/ nwn ta\ peri\ th= j politei/ aj dielqei= n. This "you" is the insistent audience of Republic, and the same ambiguity arises that first emerged in the context of e0 gw/ : is it Socrates who is now addressing the triad of Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates-the literal sense-or is Plato addressing the reader? 99 Whoever this "I" is, he was eager to gratify his insistent audience because he knew-and for some, this will suggest Plato as opposed to Socrates 100 -that nobody could give him a more suitable return than "you," assuming, of course that "you" are "willing" to give him "the discourse that comes next." 101 Here's what Plato writes: proqu/ mwj e0 xarizo/ mhn, ei0 dw\ j o3 ti to\ n e9 xh= j lo/ gon ou0 de/ nej a2 n u9 mwñ e0 qelo/ / ntwn i9 kanw/ teron a0 podoi= en.
102 Given the fact that Critias breaks off his narrative before the war between Atlantis and the City of Socrates-allegedly preborn as ancient Athens-can even begin, it is clearly not Socrates' three auditors who supply o9 e9 xh= j lo/ goj if Socrates is "I" and the Three are "you," then Socrates is disappointed in Timaeus-Critias. 103 But if I am right, and this "I" is Plato 98 At Phaedrus 275d, after making the comparison to painting also found at Timaeus 19b4-c2, Socrates famously claims that written texts "remain most solemnly silent" (translation Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff) and even "when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it always needs its father's support; alone it can neither defend itself nor come to its own support." But when deliberately fashioned by its father to attack itself-as, for example, in this very text-a text comes alive by provoking its readers to come to the aid of the truth it suppresses; the passivity of the reader is the weakness that prevents Plato's texts from coming to life. And even if only a few readers will overcome this passivity, they will prove that Socrates' claim that the text "doesn't know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not" is false; a deliberately provocative text ipso facto distinguishes between active and passive readers. Incidentally, anyone who has read any Platonic dialogue twice knows that no Platonic text says the exact same thing again and again (citation); Plato's writings have proved an enduring delight because we learn something new from them every time we read them and this is even more true when we teach them. 99 Hereafter, "the Three" will refer to Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates. 100 See Altman, Plato the Teacher, 10 n. 31 on Leo Strauss. 101 The phrase to\ n e9 xh= j lo/ gon reappears at Critias 106b7. Note that the first instance of "you" in the sentence is found in a genitive absolute (u9 mwñ deome/ nwn) the second instance (u9 mwñ e0 qelo/ / ntwn), also in the genitive, appears to be another genitive absolute but is really the genitive of comparison following i9 kanw/ teron. himself, then it is entirely up to "you" to gratify him by offering "the discourse that comes next in order," described in three lines of verse: 104 "-ei0 j ga\ r po/ lemon pre/ ponta katasth/ santej th\ n po/ lin a3 pant' au0 th| ta\ prosh/ konta a0 podoi= t' a2 n mo/ noi twñ nu= n ei0 pw\ n dh\ ta0 pitaxqe/ nta, a0 ntepe/ taca u9 mi= n."
Only if "you" are willing to supply the missing lo/ goj and lead the Socratic City, internalized in your own soul, 105 by fighting an interpretive 106 war against "the plausible myth" of Timaeus, does Plato's "now" become now; only when you yourself become "the missing fourth" will you realize that it is the elusive Plato who is saying: a4 kai\ nu= n le/ gw, "the things which even now I am saying."
The notion that the City's Guardians will be required to fight the kind of interpretive battles I am suggesting here is introduced in Republic VII. Having already described the five mathematical sciences so prominent in Timaeus, 107 and now turning toward the training in dialectic 108 -the give and take of discussion conspicuous by its absence in the astronomer's discourse 109 -Socrates says:
"And is not this true of the good likewise-that the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the idea of the good [th/ n tou= a0 gaqou= i0 de/ an] and who cannot, as if in battle [kai/ w# sper e0 n ma/ xh| ], through all refutations emerging, not eager to refute by recourse to opinion but to essence [mh\ kata\ do/ can a0 lla\ kat' ou0 si/ an proqumou/ menoj e0 le/ gxein], proceeding throughout in all of these with the discourse untoppled-the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good but if he joins himself in any way to some image [ei0 dw/ lou] he does so by reputation [do/ ch| ] but not knowledge [e0 pisth/ mh| ]." 110 I have called this passage "the Battle Hymn of the Republic" and have argued that Plato uses it to point the way forward to the "difficult studies" 111 that lie ahead, beginning with Timaeus. If we really embraced the absolute disjunction between Being and Becoming that emerges from Socrates' justification of the Third Wave of Paradox and reaches its highest development in the Cave, we would discover in the astronomer Timaeus the first of three "images" Plato will create in order to determine whether "you" will refute those images mh\ kata\ do/ can a0 lla\ kat' ou0 si/ an. 112 Were you to do so, you would find his discourse objectionable from beginning to end, from the absence of the Idea of the Good, the reduction of otherworldly Being to the status of exemplars for worldly things to copy, 113 the mixture of Becoming and Being in the World Soul, 114 the deeply problematic xw/ ra, 115 the physicalization of the tripartite soul, through to the patently ridiculous origin of the first woman. Daryl Tress has astutely pointed out that the most problematic passages in Timaeus all involve the "intermediates" he inserts between Being and Becoming, each one of them deeply fissured as a result of the impossible task they are assigned. 116 And it is in his account of the close connection between soul and body that Timaeus inveighs against precisely the kind of verbal battles that the reader would need in order to break the spell of his discourse by showing that "the plausible" is actually merely "deceptive."
"When within it [sc. the body] there is a soul more powerful than the body [when is this not the case where philosophers are concerned?] and this soul gets excited, it churns the whole being and fills it from inside with diseases, and when it concentrates on one or another course of study or enquiry [e.g., philosophy], it wears the body out. And again, when the soul engages in public or private teaching sessions [i.e., as politician or teacher] or verbal battles [ma/ xaj e0 n lo/ goij], the disputes and contentions that then occur cause the soul to fire the body up and rock it back and forth, so inducing discharges [r9 eu/ mata] which trick most doctors into making misguided diagnoses [ta0 nai/ tia ai0 tiasqai poiei= ]." 117 Presumably the r9 eu/ mata in question include sweat and tears. In short: the reason Plato placed Timaeus directly after Republic is because the relationship between the two dialogues replicates the division in Parmenides' poem between "Truth" and "the Way of Opinion." 118 It is naturally beyond the scope of this article to subject the whole of Plato's Timaeus to a section-by-section analysis; my purpose here is rather to indicate how it should be read and in what manner the true Platonist-i.e., "the missing fourth"-should respond to it. Plato has indicated the nature of that response not only in Timaeus but also in Critias, the dialogue that naturally and indeed immediately follows Timaeus. It is a noteworthy difference between these dialogues that only one of them is complete; Critias ends just as Critias is about to insert a speech to the imaginary Atlantids 119 into the mouth of Zeus:
"But as Zeus, god of the gods, reigning as king according to law, could clearly see this state of affairs, he observed this noble race lying in this abject state and resolved to punish them [di/ khn au0 toi= j e0 piqei= nai] and to make them more careful and harmonious [e0 mmele/ steroi] as a result of their chastisement." 120 The hypothesis that the reader is the missing fourth at the start of Timaeus explains why Plato deliberately concluded Critias with a missing speech of precisely this kind. My basis for making this claim is found in the opening speech of Timaeus with which Critias begins:
"My prayer is that he [sc. "that god who had existed long before in reality, but who has now been created in my words"] grant the preservation of all that has been spoken properly; but that he will impose the proper penalty [di/ khn th\ n pre/ pousan e0 pitiqe/ nai] if we have, despite our best intentions, spoken any discordant note. For the musician who strikes the wrong note the proper penalty is to bring him back into harmony [e0 mmelh= ]." 121 The verbal echoes are precise, revealing, and deliberate: by leaving room for a missing speech at the end of Timaeus-Critias, Plato invites the
